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*The biggest problem is not to let people accept  
new ideas, but to let them forget the old ones.  
(John Maynard Keynes)*

## Abstract

Thank you for the invitation – I am very pleased to be here. So to say as young Fin: trying to learn by putting forward some ideas that allow me to learn from your reactions and deliberations. And I am definitely not here as German – the country where I spent a large part of my life, the country as well of the post-WWII-Wirtschaftswunder, the economic miracle after WWII; nor do want I talk here as Irish – representing a county where I spent in the meantime another large trunk of my life, and the country which had been known for some time as representative of a booming economy: the Celtic tiger, and now gaining fame on the grounds of having failed to keep even a tiny cat alive.

Both successes – and both later relative failures – can be traced back to fundamentally a very similar pattern of which the fundamental feature, so the argument of the present contribution: the fundamental individualism of market based economies, in which the social remains subordinated, takes the form of an add-on and then becomes artificial. This undermines as well the character of a more fundamental approach towards Human Rights and the recognition of the need for shifting the debate towards a different understanding of the economic process.

Introduction: Why look at one problem if we can have three?

It may come along as strange coincidence: in 1989, Francis Fukuyama heralded the end of history and not even 20 years later we face a revival of history, capitalism in its supposedly “cleanest form”: a capitalism which had been arguably a purely “technical mechanisms, liberated from any ideological ballast” presents itself as expanse of rubble – all the trouble due to a bubble. If we actually look at the current situation, there is a paradox: Though we apparently regain history, we do so only falling back on historical patterns, patterns that are

well known from history. However, the understanding of history does not follow the understanding of history as development made and controlled by man. As such, the reappearance of history on the agenda is somewhat contradicting those principles from which it arose. But still, it is as well the development of historical consciousness in terms of an emerging need that we have to control history; that we are responsible for the development and furthermore for showing that alternatives actually do exist – leaving for a while the two questions open (though they can never be really left open): Who are we? And: What kind of alternatives do we look for?

Of course, we may ask to which extent people ever made their own history – when the revolution successfully ended and life normalised, the new phase had been characterised by reinterpreting the liberty of rights into the freedom of contracts, the redefinition of equality on the basis of exchange and the understanding of fraternity in its capitalised form: as matter of social capital.

It may seem rather provocative to some. And to others it may appear being too abstract: we all have to cope with our daily struggles and these are characterised by such requirements of contracts, exchange and the need to engage with other: invest (in) social capital in order to overcome the demands of immediate issues. It is then actually in two ways that the burst of the bubble left a field of rubble: an economic crisis that goes far beyond the standards known by our contemporaries; and a debris of different ideas, suggestions of overcoming the current situation, some more pointing on technical fallacies, others suggesting the need for a more principal change. Taking a human rights perspective in this context points on two areas that are of special importance:

- \* Politically, the raising fundamentalism – including in terms of policy development and also in terms of economic strategies different kind of retrenchment approaches;
- \* Economically, the partial resurgence of orientations towards a more controlled, steered economy on the one hand and on the other hand the emphasis of decentralised and responsible economies.

And it is not by chance that we find following merits praised this year by the receiving the Nobel-Prize: in economics (i) the “analysis of economic governance, especially the commons” (Elinor Ostrom); (ii) the “analysis of economic governance, especially the boundaries of the firm” (Oliver E. Williamson); for peace: (iii) the “extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples” (Barack Obama) – which is probably more meant to be the application of diplomacy rather than crude violence in defence of the American dream; and for literature (IV) for the effort by Herta Müller “who, with the concentration of poetry and the frankness of prose, depicts the landscape of the dispossessed”.

We know poverty again and we know that overcoming poverty needs more than trust in a liberal market society. Still, to me one thing is striking: With all the moaning and with all the efforts to overcome the raising problems there is a lack of readiness to really look into the economic problems of the current crisis. And furthermore, there is a rather fundamental lack of look into the question of how to develop a rights-based approach. We can go even a step further: in different veins we find a re-subjection of matters of the causes, effects and necessary consequences: charity instead of rights, complain about a lack of responsibility rather than seeing the current situation as consequent perseverance of the principles of the chosen economic model; and search for a global moral consensus without, however, accepting the right of benefit in equal terms. In this context we find as well – sometimes frantic – attempts and searches for solutions of very different kind. Though politically highly problematic to mention them together, we find religious fundamentalism, religious or value-conservative reflections or alternative economic approaches, searching for ways of change, emerging from small-scale niche productions. It is surely interesting to discuss in detail the different instances. However, it seems to be equally valuable to look at the different perspectives more from a birds perspective, trying (i) to make out fundamental flaws of the current debate and (ii) defining some core pillars for a way forward. For me, addressing this congress, part of the 100 years celebration of the Social Policy Association of Finland, means to take up an age-old debate, trying to overcome the split which we see today throughout different arrays: the

triangularisation of Western, capitalist societies and thinking – a triangularisation that comes along in different forms: the market, the state and the family or the communities; science, social science and somewhat in the middle: economics as a kind of “exact social science”; the distinction between state, contract and regulating instance – usually seen as developmental pattern but also to be seen as pattern of different simultaneously existing patterns of integration (cf. Herrmann, 2009); the trias politica of the separation of powers; the division of rights, according to Tom H. Marshall a matter of the historical development from civil, to political and social rights and not least to first footprints of western modernity: liberté, égalité, fraternité – perhaps all going back to the holy trinity as it is characteristic for Christianity. But it may be as well the consequence of a rather mechanical understanding of dialectics as simplified version of thesis, antitheses and synthesis.

Looking for a perspective – not least a perspective in developing more appropriate policy answers – means first and foremost to analyse where all these separations actually have their origin.

Let me start by looking at a division that I consider as being most fundamental – having even a kind of anthropological dimension to it: the division between and even separation of science, social science and practice. Using the terms science I do actually not mean anything like it in our current understanding. Rather, I mean first the fact that human beings developed the ability to abstract planning processes – thinking – from immediate practice, later going further by splitting the way of thinking itself, looking for the technical solution for upcoming tasks (here and now and as well as matter of developing an understanding of time) – the objective or instrumental reason – on the one hand and the subjective reason on the other hand, the first

*dealing predominantly with the relation between means and ends, with the appropriateness of procedural rules in respect to the aims, which themselves are more or less accepted, without being questioned in terms of their own rationality.*

*(Horkheimer, 1952: 5f.)*

(see as well the contribution on Science – Social Science – Practice Or: Searching for Responsibility in this volume). Saying this can be seen in some way as anthropological question, does not mean to deny a primarily social split going hand in hand, not least a division between powers: those who could accumulate power and those who had been limited to a space of immediacy – only much later being translated into a systematic pattern of (i) separation of power as we find it in the modern state and (ii) a specific class structure: proprietors, labourers and managers.

Understanding this division as a principle feature is important – but we do not have to go further into detail of its epistemological meaning nor do we have to look at the social meaning in terms of the division of classes. The division has in its own terms only potential meanings in this respect and it had been a historical question of developing it further according to different options – and the relevance in various areas of societal life. I want to look at two points which are in my opinion frequently neglected – and it is from here where the general topic of this congress – Human Rights: For Sale or Saviour in the Globalising Market Economy – gains its very specific meaning. So, I want to talk about (i) the “outsourcing of economy” (and its later dominance) and (ii) the loss of rights in favour of gaining legal security. These are contemplations that are at the beginning, with which I enter a new area of thinking – and I want to invite you to follow in this attempt. And as new attempt, these considerations are at times possibly – and hopefully – provocative.

### The Loss of the Economy

The world talks – and complains – about the economisation of life, the subordination of all fibres of social and individual existence under the economic interest. More correctly we hear people speaking about marketisation and managerialisation. Surely and justifiably, we can speak of such colonialisation. However, we may turn it around, looking at the origins, then speak of the loss of control over the economy by social forces, a process of outsourcing, leaving the economy to develop itself as special area, responsible for what had been understood as “wealth production”. This is, of course, a complex development –

we have to take into consideration the development of class structures, the question of property and control over the means of production etc; but I want to focus for a moment on two other issues: (i) the individualisation of economic actors, the meaning of products being already before the emergence of industrial capitalism only validated ex post, when they entered the market and the producers could verify the price of their products when they entered the exchange process (a development which peaked with the Renaissance) and (ii) reduction of wealth on its material dimension: the accumulation of goods. We can see the tension of the second in particular when we look at the early trade societies: the Fugger and Medici alike had been people who gathered huge amounts of material assets and still had to justify, legitimise this by supporting the fine arts, the beauty and joy of life. As questionable it is, we have to admit that in some way they "returned to society what they took out of society" – mind, I said as questionable as it is because much of this return was in reality just another way of personal gain in disguised form. – Anyway, that is a matter for another day and probably as well even for another public. Fact is that increasingly the development followed the pattern of separating individual life from social life. As part of this the accumulation of individual wealth, measured by success in econometric terms emerged as standard for well-being and success alike. Actually one may see here already that capitalism – in its infant stage – had been well compatible with Catholicism though it had been capitalism that finally forced into Protestantism, not only translating the fight for paradise into a fight for this-sidedness but also translating the fight for paradise into a fight for individual performance, expressed in individual well-being.

Of course, the decisive moment in this context is not the question of meaning or belief systems but the shift of the economic question away from its productive core towards circulation. Sure, it had been still the producer who had been required for success. However, not less important had been that measuring success had been increasingly seen as a matter of measuring success on the market place: measured ex ante. And the true entrepreneur had been the one who succeeded in what Marx later looked extensively at under the term of the exchange value. We are now dealing with the isolated individual, whose social

existence is – evidently – only realised outside of the production and ex ante on the market: as matter of exchange. The social itself is redefined by actually de-socialising its character: rather than entering a social bond as productive relationship (and producing this relationship in the widest sense, going far beyond the production of commodities) it is now defined as (i) contractual relationship (ii) following in a highly segmented pattern.

### The loss of rights

Speaking of a loss of rights is surely provocative – the increasing insistence on rights and moreover on equal rights for all had been not least a starring feature of Western enlightenment. And it is not least a contemporary accusation against for instance the Islam that it lacks a reformation on the basis of enlightenment. Surely, Tom M. Marshall's analysis is outstanding in tracing the development:

*I shall call these three parts, or elements, civil, political and social. The civil element is composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom, liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice. The last is of a different order from the others, because it is the right to defend and assert all one's rights on terms of equality with others and by due process of law. This shows us that the institutions most directly associated with civil rights are the courts of justice. By the political element I mean the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body. The corresponding institutions are parliament and councils of local government. By the social element I mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society. The institutions most closely connected with it are the educational system and the social services.*

(Marshall, Tom H., 1950: 8)

However, there is another possible interpretation, seeing this development not as logical enhancement, the emergence of social rights from its predecessors. Instead, we may see it equally as reinvention of the social under the new conditions outlined by the revolution of the late 1700s and even the predecessor standing at the cradle of the renaissance. The conditions for the social changed fundamentally with the Renaissance: now it had to be developed on the foundation of a radically individualist account as it had been pointed out in the previous section: the “outsourcing of the economy” and the further development of its dominance as matter of objective reason. In simple terms, subsequent to the shift of the accumulation regime being geared to exchange processes rather than being focused on production, rights had to be translated into contracting relationships rather than dealing with the wider process of social production (on another occasion I am dealing with this question more in depth – see Herrmann, forthcoming). This means as well that contracts had been dealing with such segmented outcomes of social relationships rather than taking care of the permanent constitution of social relationships and rights. It may sound far-fetched but we can easily see in these patterns the deeper origin in what Niklas Luhmann called “Legimitation by Procedure” but as well some of the actual causes of the current crisis: the dis-embedding of the exchange process from their productive basis – later this will be taken up again.

‘There is no such thing as society”

The phrase is well-known – at least to those who followed the political debates around the reign of the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The words in a little bit more context are as follows:

*I think we have gone through a period when too many children and people have been given to understand “I have a problem, it is the Government’s job to cope with it!” or “I have a problem, I will go and get a grant to cope with it!” “I am homeless, the Government must house me!” and so they are casting their*

*problems on society and who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families and no government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and then also to help look after our neighbour and life is a reciprocal business and people have got the entitlements too much in mind without the obligations, because there is no such thing as an entitlement unless someone has first met an obligation and it is, I think, one of the tragedies in which many of the benefits we give, which were meant to reassure people that if they were sick or ill there was a safety net and there was help, that many of the benefits which were meant to help people who were unfortunate ...*

*(Thatcher, 1987)*

This statement had been correctly criticised by many, seeing in such statement as challenge to the social or welfare state, aiming on retrenchment policies.

However, as much as it had been a normative statement, arguing from a conservative, neo-liberal stance against possible claims of individuals against the state, it can be seen in a completely different light: as analytical statement that reflects very much the success of this neo-liberal strategy – the success of not only the recent historical retrenchment policies but the success of a secular movement of a radical individualisation and loss of deep-rooted socialbility.

In this light the retrenchment policies of the recent years are actually not as serious as they are frequently outlined – and though I do not want to follow up on this there are various studies showing that the actual level of provision is not necessarily worsening. The real problem has to be seen in the shift of the mode of regulation which makes now the individual – in different forms though – responsible: voucher systems, private insurance rather than public responsibility and others show different forms of desocialisation. This is highly relevant not least as matter of the re-definition of rights: it is underlining the

shift to legalising rights on an individualist basis, following the rules of exchange rather than being a matter of “social production”.

At the end this is characterising as well the social structures: class divisions not only disappear behind further differentiation: bourgeois and proletarian developing to owners, producers, managers; developing to various groups of stratifying systems: measuring various clusters and finally refusing to classify. In a way the individualisation of social rights – a contradiction in terms – may be taken as precise grasp of this development. It is the opposite to the Bismarkian extreme, who allegedly said that he would not know any classes anymore but only Germans – what came along as his justification to lead the world into a disastrous war is now the pure individualism (cf. as well Herrmann/Dorrity, 2009) that opens a way to a total social war – in which even the profiteer are potential losers.

We can now come back to what had been mentioned at the end of the previous section, the drift to “Legimitation by Procedure” and the dis-embedding of the exchange process from its productive basis as one of the actual causes of the current crisis.

The understanding of the social, being now reduced on exchange processes cannot deal anymore with the constitutional processes: the formulation of laws as technical process is more important than the political bargaining – a fact that can be seen in the accelerated speed of altering legislation: laws are not made to last but to fulfil short-term needs.

Paradoxically, the emphasis of norms like self-responsibility, mutual support, equality and dignity are loosing meaning as they are delinked from their context, namely their foundation in conditional relationships and constitutional processes, of which the factors are presented in the following table:

Conditional factors	Constitutional factors	Normative factors
Socio-economic security	Personal (human) security	Social justice

Social cohesion	Social recognition	Solidarity
Social inclusion	Social responsiveness	Equal value
Social empowerment	Personal capacity	Human dignity

Table 1

We can go a step further and say that any discussion on rights has to find its basis in real processes rather than looking out for normative guidelines – the self-evidence of the latter is misleading when it comes to complex processes.

### Regaining the Commons – Regaining the Social

We can see many debates on the failures of the systems. Over the years – after 1917 – this system could actually grow and stabilise on the grounds of competition. The socialist system on the one hand – whatever we think about it – had been one factor that paradoxically strengthened specifically its counterpart as the latter continued on the set parameters: individualist and econometric, short-term oriented growth.<sup>2</sup> Another factor of developing strength has to be seen in the ideological factor of the Balfour declaration – seemingly far out of context, but important as it put aside state building on the level of contracts rather than treaties.

But looking beyond this success we are now facing a massive crisis: the loss of socialism meant “paradise lost” – and in the present context the paradise is not the claimed paradise of the workers and peasants in the east nor the loss of an divine authoritative instance; rather it is the loss of the paradise of the free and social market economies of the west. And we find counter-movements. We can distinguish four major trends:

1) The radical market economies of the early phases – then at least in mainstream economics more or less uncontested, and on the advance on a global scale. A newly claimed universalist perspective of wealth. And although

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<sup>2</sup> That the short-term orientation meant success in the long-term has to be seen as paradox though and we see today that long-term had been limited to the time of the ongoing competition.

capitalism has created a single market, it did not erase the multiple divides between rich and poor: multiple divides as we find them within countries, between regions, between individuals and social groups and in very different aspects characterising people's life.

2) We find another trend, actually going very much hand in hand with this: the shift in the centre-periphery relationships and development of countries of the former periphery into new centres. It had been not least the before-mentioned development: the development of an unbridled capitalism that allowed this shift, giving now space for economic countries that had been up to hitherto at the periphery. On the global level it is the changing position of China in the global economy; and on a smaller scale it had been Ireland for some time and it are the – temporarily failed – attempts of countries like Hungary to gain such special role. We should not overlook that for instance in Ireland these huge successes had been only possible by accepting paying huge social costs. And as well by accepting extreme consequences now – including schools asking the children to provide toilet paper (Ireland, 2009).<sup>3</sup>

3) The – in my opinion not least – politically evoked celebration of vaguely new economics: if we look at the Nobel prize laureates in economics, we see a shift probably beginning with Amartya Sen, then going on to Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Krugman and as said now Elinor Ostrom and Oliver E. Williamson we see a shift towards a more open understanding of economics. In short, we see

- \* a turn towards political-economy, in tendency linking production, consumption as productive process, distribution and exchange and seeing them as entity
- \* a turn towards the "moralisation" of the economic process, seeing it based in and/or geared towards some kind of socio-moral responsibility
- \* a turn towards the economic process itself as one element of a wider process which can be taken as social process.

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<sup>3</sup> Sure, looking at another article, written by Julia Bönisch under the heading Gebühren für Schultoiletten (Bönisch, Julia, 2009) it seems to be worthwhile to make a comparative study on schools and toilets in Europe.

The development of awarding the Nobel Prize is surely not a feasible indicator. In my opinion the crucial point is anyway not really the shift towards a more Keynesian approach but the move towards a strengthened moral approach or an ethical economy. Indeed, we can see such moral dimension a long time before, actually marking the work of the two of the three greatest economists of modernity: Adam Smith and John Maynard Keynes – later I will get back to this, looking at the third one. But first briefly on Smith and Keynes. Everybody who at least briefly engaged in the work of the economist of Scottish enlightenment will know well the Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations; and will be equally aware of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. And the economist who pleaded for new policies as answer on the world economic crisis in the 1920s is not only known for his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. But he is equally known for his general reformist notion:

*The day is not far off when the economic problem will take the back seat where it belongs, and the arena of the heart and the head will be occupied or reoccupied, by our real problems / the problems of life and of human relations, of creation and behavior and religion.*

*(Keynes, John Maynard, 1945-1946)*

And it is not only about such very basic moral considerations, but it is also about the more concrete questions. Again and again we find at least since the 1970 social indicator movements; we find as well the debates on well-being and the search for European economic policies which should not be an end in itself but contribute to the living standards of European citizens. And more recently we find this merging into a debate under the heading "Beyond GDP", the recent outcome being a communication issued by the European Commission under the title GDP and Beyond. Measuring Progress in a Changing World (European Commission, 2009).

In any case, there are two problems with these searches: The first question is from where can we actually gain the moral values that we claim as guiding principles? The second question concerns a more pragmatic issue: The current

approaches of going beyond GDP lack a clear focus. They surely take into account very important issues but there is no clarity about their order and there is only intuitive consideration from where they come.

This brings us possibly to the more fundamental shift which is only partly reflected in the list of Nobel laureates. It is about the very inclusion of more complex patterns of policy making as well into the economic realm, though remaining with the arguments fundamentally within the framework of a divided economy, namely an economic system which separates rather strictly between production in the strict sense, consumption, distribution and exchange.

4) The search for niches – alternative economies, sometimes looking for an alternative globalisation, sometimes seeing themselves as anti-globalisation movements. It is a quite diverse field, often contradicting in terms. For instance we find a claim for a social economy though is brought forward with the knowledge that it can only be maintained in a small niche and by a small number of especially conscious people, hoping that it may spread further from there. Nothing is wrong with such approaches though the problem remains that the social character is at least limited in scope if not as well in terms of the actual understanding of the social: the danger is simply the limitation of strategies on temporary solutions within a limited space of action, lacking structural effects. In this sense they are depending on individual will, rather than on structural change.

#### Who? What? How?

At the beginning I pointed on two questions: Who are we? And: What kind of alternatives do we look for? We could leave them open for a while – and still, they are at the core of any consideration if it wants to be a serious consideration. And they actually underlie – unspoken – the analysis. And finally another question has to be added: How can we get there?

I am well aware of the limitations of the following remarks. The critical points of any strategy are the following:

- \* I see a flaw in orientations on moral approaches and also in approaches that are reduced on calls for (re-)regulation – this is concerned with both, dealing with the challenges from the economic crisis and the questions of human rights.
- \* I see a fundamental problem with the outsourcing of economic processes and their separation from wider aspects that go beyond the production of goods and monetary values.
- \* I propose that any solution to rights and economic crisis – as interrelated challenge – has to look for ways of including global and long-term time perspectives.
- \* I think we need to think about possibilities not as technical but as substantial question, acknowledging the context of space and time.

This may sound abstract – but actually it is rather simple and can easily be translated into some policy requirements with which I want to conclude. And I know that some of these topics will be taken up during the following negotiations of this conference.

1) On the first issue: we need to overcome the limitations of the abstract character of moral norms and formal criteria. For achieving this, we need to present a clear focus, i.e. a clear understanding of the kind of society and the kind of living together we want to achieve. Though it may sound to be a circular argument, we have to develop our thinking from everyday's life and therein

*the extent to which people are able to participate in social relationships under conditions which enhance their well-being, capacity and individual potential.*

*(Beck et al. 2007: 25)*

This gives a clear orientation to any policy – be it social policy or economic policy, policies in the areas of health care or education: it is the need to approach political questions from a vision of the society we want to live in.

This provides as well a sound framework for looking at specific issues as for instance technological innovations, the globalisation of economic processes or demographic change. However, the more important aspect is the inclusion of an implicit wider understanding of processes in question. As much as we are usually confronted with a limitation of economic processes on their econometric dimension and the institutional mechanisms as means of steering we have now a different access as well towards institutions: Politics matter, indeed. And we see this not least in the different patterns applied for instance in the member states of the European Union, thus in a relatively small and somewhat homogenous space. The institutional differences are actually much more important in their meaning of mechanisms of socialisation rather than simply as matter of regulation. This is clearly shown when looking for instance at the Nordic countries and their relative success in answering the different economic crisis. This is surely about economic performances and the "gains of having productive social policy". But here it is proposed to see it as matter of a relatively extended degree of socialised processes that include economic mechanisms in a wider understanding.

2) Though societies are highly differentiated, this does not mean that we can reduce complexity by concentrating on segments of societies: bureaucracy exists because it does not follow the abstract rules as outlined by Max Weber; the market economy works only where interventions guarantee that the mechanisms that are immanently undermining the market principle are counteracted. And society does not work as invisible hand, steering egoistic rational action. It is about the social existence of humans, producing their existence in society, the action being based on the interrelationship of conditional, constitutional and normative factors, as tentatively outlined in the following figure.




Figure 1

This opens – actually requires – to look at economic processes as matter of socio-economy, emphasising and bringing together

- \* socio-economics as matter of accumulation regimes and modes of regulations
- \* social economy
- \* social rights as globalising the orientation of the first in terms of space (“global social justice”)
- \* social rights as globalising the orientation of the first in terms of time (“sustainability”).

3) Looking at material living standards and well-being is, of course, indispensable. However, for analysing the real dimension of this it may be required to shift the attention: Rather than going beyond GDP we should look at other than GDP, namely the “production of social integrity”.

4) The fourth point is surely the most difficult – looking for the actors, looking for the practice perspective. I cannot look at even all major points that play a role here. I only want to mention two. (i) I mentioned Smith and Keynes – and then I pointed on a third economist, then without saying his name. Of course, the person who had been referred to is Karl Marx. I do not want to dispute the

political meaning here – at least we are back to a stage where it is again allowed to name him without being blamed. I want to point on the epistemological dimension of his work and even here looking at one point only – a factor that is in my opinion of central importance in the context of our discussion. Already in his earlier considerations, before writing his opus magnum *The Capital*, he elaborated the entity of production, consumption, distribution and exchange. And he emphasised the need to concentrate on production as a complex process, going far beyond the production of commodities. If we look closely, we can say it had been not least about the production of rights (see in this context Herrmann/Dorrity, 2009).

(ii) Finally, let us not forget what brought us here on these two days: we are gathering here on the occasion of the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Finish Social Policy Association. This should remind us that we went a long way: hazardous at times, being crisscrossed by many failures – and as diverse as they had been if looking at the single cases: what all these stoppages had been about, they have in common that they failed to work on visions, only engaging in the search for technical solutions for short-term problems, only being concerned with comparison of good practice rather than looking for a society in which people have rights as social beings rather than as individualised subjects of competitive markets.

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